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Note
Balancing, Press Immunity, and the Compatibility of
Tort Law with the First Amendment
Mark Weidemaier*
While the First Amendment' imposes limitations on pri-
vate actions against the press for defamatory publications,2 the
press is generally liable for the torts it commits while gather-
ing news After all, the exercise of a First Amendment right
does not ordinarily create immunity from tort liability, and
private property is not dedicated to the exercise of First
Amendment rights by the general public.' Why should a "No
Trespassing" sign defeat a Jehovah's Witness pursuing a convert
but not a reporter pursuing a story?5 Yet imposing tort liability
on journalists may deter investigative reportage and deprive
the public of valuable information. In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc.,6 a North Carolina jury awarded $5.5 million
dollars in punitive damages against ABC for an investigation
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B A. 1994,
Carleton College.
1. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I (emphasis added).
2. See generally ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER,
AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-37 (1994) (describing incorporation of First
Amendment principles into libel and slander law).
3. Cf. Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]here is nojournalists' privilege to trespass.").
4. Compare Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)
(holding that a person may protect his privacy interest in the home even if
that means interfering with "the highly important right to communicate"),
with Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46(1983) (describing streets and parks as traditional public fora on which First
Amendment rights may be asserted).
5. Cf. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943) (voiding ordi-
nance prohibiting distribution of pamphlets as applied to leaflets advertising
Jehovah's Witness meeting but suggesting that a city can "punish those who
call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant").
6. 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
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conducted by the news magazine Prime Time Live.' Prime
Time Live investigators had falsified employment applications
to obtain jobs at two Food Lion grocery stores.' The reporters
recorded activities in work areas of the store with hidden cam-
eras, and Prime Time Live ultimately used the footage in an
expos6 of allegedly unsanitary food practices.9
The Seventh Circuit reached a contrary result in Desnick
v. ABC.'" In Desnick, an opthamalic clinic and two of its phy-
sicians sued Prime Time Live for trespass, invasion of privacy,
and other claims after Prime Time Live reporters had posed as
patients and had used hidden cameras to record their conver-
sations with physicians at two clinic offices." The footage ap-
peared in a Prime Time Live expose of unnecessary surgery
and Medicare fraud.'2 The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary
judgment against the clinic and its physicians. 3
As these two cases indicate, the media have the potential
to ferret out and expose fraudulent or illegal activity in all
walks of life.'4 However, the contrary results in Food Lion and
Desnick suggest that tort law is so unpredictable when applied
to newsgathering conduct that the press will eschew investiga-
tive reports that could ultimately benefit the public as a whole.
For example, if subterfuge is the best or only way to expose illicit
conduct in industry,'5 tort law may lead to substantial under-
production of socially useful information. To counteract this
effect and to encourage investigative reportage that might ex-
pose illegal or fraudulent conduct, a number of authors have
7. See id. at 927. The district judge ultimately found the award consti-
tutionally suspect, and remitted it to $315,000. See id. at 937-40.
& See id. at 927.
9. See id.
10. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
1L See id. at 1348.
12. See id. at 1348-49 (describing the content of the broadcast).
13. See id. at 1353, 1355. The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs' defamation
claim. See id. at 1351.
14. Cf Lyrissa C. Barnett, Note, Intrusion and the Investigative Reporter,
71 TEY L. REV. 433, 433 (1992) ("[Undercover newsgathering has proven ef-
fective in exposing fraud, corruption, and illegal activity in government and
industry." (footnote omitted)).
15. See id. at 434, 437 (describing some cases where surreptitious news-
gathering produced stories that might otherwise have been unavailable and
arguing that reporters should enjoy a qualified privilege to employ subterfuge
to monitor people engaged in the "public business").
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suggested that reporters enjoy a qualified privilege to commit
newsgathering torts. 6
This Note contends that arguments for such a privilege
rest on the debatable assumption that tort law is underprotec-
tive of the media's right to gather news. The press enjoys sub-
stantial newsgathering freedom, and there is currently little
evidence that newsgathering tort suits have substantial First
Amendment implications. Part I briefly discusses the conflict
between private rights and newsgathering interests and de-
scribes the arguments for granting the media immunity from
minor newsgathering torts. Part II describes current case law,
using a framework frequently found in discussions of news-
gathering cases: whether the court "balances" First Amend-
ment interests with the private rights at stake. This Part con-
cludes that the "balancing" distinction ultimately has little
meaning and suggests that courts frequently engage in a tort
analysis flexible enough to accommodate newsgathering interests.
Part III argues that a newsgathering "privilege" cannot be
grounded in the text or legislative history of the First Amend-
ment and is not supported by the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. This Part suggests that a news-
gathering privilege assigns too much value to the newsgather-
ing function in relation to the right to protect other private
rights. This Part also contends that many of the assumptions
that underlie arguments for a newsgathering privilege are un-
warranted. Finally, Part IV briefly considers a more produc-
tive argument for limiting media liability for tortious news-
gathering-that publication damages should be excluded from
recovery in tort actions.
I. TORT ACTIONS AGAINST TEE MEDIA, AND THE NEED
FOR A NEWSGATHERING PRIVILEGE
Plaintiffs whose lawsuits implicate First Amendment
rights17 face substantial barriers. A defamation plaintiff, for
16. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the
Cohen Maledicta That Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 (1997); Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in Get-
ting the News: Toward a First Amendment Protection From Tort Liability for
Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145 (1996); Bar-
nett, supra note 14; Stephen M. Stern, Note, Witch Hunt or Protected Speech:
Striking a First Amendment Balance Between Newsgathering and General
Laws, 37 WASHBuRN L.J. 115 (1997).
17. Enforcing generally applicable laws in civil suits between private
parties does constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, be-
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example, must prove not only that the story was false, but that
the defendant acted with "actual malice.""8 However, plaintiffs
suing in tort for acts associated with newsgathering, as op-
posed to publication, can avoid this increased First Amend-
ment scrutiny.19 Newsgathering tort suits thus raise the pos-
sibility that corporate plaintiffs will seek to prevent future
undercover investigations by attacking the conduct of the press
in gathering the news rather than the truth of what is re-
ported."
A. TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE MEDIA
While newsgathering in public places is typically not ac-
tionable,2' the media face a number of challenges while gather-
ing news on private property.22 Of principal interest are the
trespass and intrusion upon seclusion torts. Trespass is a
particularly formalistic cause of action," which encompasses
"any misfeasance, transgression, or offense which damages an-
other person's, health, reputation, or property."' Trespass is
typically a strict liability tort,25 and plaintiffs can recover
cause "W[the test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised." New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (rejecting the argument
that civil suits between private parties could not constitute state action).
18. See id. at 279-80 (defining actual malice as knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of whether report was false or not).
19. See C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 12-1,
at 429 (1997) ("Newsgathering in nongovernmental venues, however, has
largely given rise to a body of law rich in common law and statutory complex-
ity, but decidedly underdeveloped in constitutional doctrine.").
20. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 16, at 148 ("[A] plaintiff who is unable to
prove actual malice ... may instead file a claim for general law violations
stemming from newsgathering activities; the objective being to side-step First
Amendment protections that require proof of actual malice to obtain actual
and punitive damages.").
21. Cf. infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (providing examples of
courts rejecting claims arising out of newgathering in public places).
22. See DIENES ET AL., supra note 19, § 12-4.
23. LeBel, supra note 16, at 1159 ("Historically, the tort of trespass to
land has been one of the most formalistic causes of action.').
24. 7 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 23:1, at
592 (1990). To prevail on its trespass claim, Food Lion had to prove "(1) [tlhat
the plaintiff was.., in possession of the land at the time the alleged trespass
was committed; (2) [tlhat the defendant made an unauthorized... entry on
the land; and (3) [t]hat the plaintiff suffered damage by [the] invasion of his
rights to possession." Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 951 F. Supp.
1217, 1221 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (citation omitted).
25. See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(discussing California law).
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nominal damages even where no harm occurs, and even where
the intrusion is accidental and interferes with few, if any,
property rights.26
The intrusion upon seclusion tort is also relevant to the
media's ability surreptitiously to monitor its investigative tar-
gets. Intrusion upon seclusion imposes liability for "an inten-
tional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another which
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."27 Surrepti-
tious newsgathering may invoke liability for trespass, intru-
sion upon seclusion, or both. And, if courts treat the subse-
quent publication of the story as a proximate result of the
trespass, the press may be liable for any damages caused by
publication.' These damages are potentially vast, because
they might include the investigative target's lost profits and
decreases in stock value.29 The prospect of punitive damages
may further "chill" the media's willingness to employ subter-
fuge in gathering the news.30 Without a privilege to commit
minor newsgathering torts, many fear that information vital to
the public interest will remain hidden.3'
26. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (1835) (holding defen-
dant liable for nominal damages for entering plaintiffs land with surveyor,
despite the fact that the defendant did not damage the land in any way).
27. See, e.g., Hanson v. Hancock County Mem'1 Hosp., 938 F. Supp. 1419,
1435 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
28. Compare Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956,
966 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (disallowing damages associated with publication as un-
related to the underlying tort), with Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,
250 (9th Cir. 1971) ("No interest protected by the First Amendment is ad-
versely affected by permitting damages for intrusion to be enhanced by the
fact of later publication of the information that the publisher improperly ac-
quired").
29. Cf. Food Lion, 964 F. Supp. at 958 (rejecting Food Lion's claim for
damages proximately resulting from publication of ABC's tortiously obtained
information and stating that "damages resulting from 'lost profits, lost sales,
diminished stock value or anything of that nature! would not be permitted").
30. Cf. Lori Keeton, Note, What Is Really Rotten in the Food Lion Case:
Chilling the Media's Unethical Newsgathering Techniques, 49 FLA. L. REV.
111, 135 (1997) (citing with approval the fact that "since the $5.5 million
award in Food Lion, commentators have not stopped talking about how the
verdict will cause journalists to be extremely wary of undercover investiga-
tions" (footnote omitted)).
31. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 14, at 433-34.
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B. THE NEED FOR A NEWSGATHERING PRIVILEGE
In response to this fear, a number of authors have pro-
posed that courts create a partial newsgathering privilege.32
While these proposals vary in detail, each envisions a
"balancing" approach that weighs the media's (and, indirectly,
the public's) entitlement to the acquired information against
the interest protected by the tort.33 Where this test weighs in
favor of access to the information, the media would have a
qualified immunity from tort actions.34 A number of arguments
might support such an immunity.
1. The First Amendment Is About Access to Information
While this Note does not argue for a particular interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, any theory about it must place a
substantial value on information. Justice Holmes, although by
no means the first to do so,31 interpreted the speech and press
clauses as promoting the search for truth via the "marketplace
of ideas."36 Justice Brandeis read the First Amendment to
provide a safety valve for releasing social tension,37 and First
Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn understood the
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also David P. Freeman,
Note, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering on Private Property, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1334-42 (1984) (suggesting that courts adopt a balanc-
ing approach when deciding private trespass actions against the media); Note,
And Forgive Them Their Trespasses: Applying the Defense of Necessity to the
Criminal Conduct of the Newsgatherer, 103 HARV. L. REV. 890, 898-905 (1990)
(arguing for a balancing approach analogous to the defense of necessity in
criminal trespass cases against the media).
33. See, e.g., LeBel, supra note 16, at 1154 ("Courts should balance the
state interest that is served by the legal rule... against the First Amendment
interest that is served by the acquisition of the information through that ac-
tivity.").
34- See id. ("The First Amendment [protects] conduct leading to the ac-
quisition of information that it would be in the public interest to publish.).
35. Holmes's views echo John Stuart Mill, for example: "[Ilt is only by the
collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance
being supplied." JoHN STUART MILL, ON LiBERTY 76 (1859).
36. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
37. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curting) (claiming that the framers knew that "order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination... [and] that the path of safety lies
in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed reme-
dies").
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Amendment to protect expression of ideas and information
crucial to democratic self-governance.38 The First Amendment
may also protect the press's ability to disseminate information
necessary to counterbalance government abuse. 9 Access to in-
formation is essential to all of these ends. Where the govern-
ment monopolizes information in the public interest, and
where granting universal access to that information would
jeopardize the government's ability to function, a useful com-
promise might be to allow the media limited access rights.4
Allowing such access might even further the constitutional
scheme.4 '
The media, for example, might be immune from private
lawsuits when accompanying public officials onto private prop-
erty.42 In this case, few would deny immunity to the press.43
After all, the media serve a valuable function in informing the
public of the manner in which public servants conduct their of-
ficial duties.44 This same rationale suggests that the press
38. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOvERNMENT 22-27 (1948)
39. For example, the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 condemned the Sedition
Act of 1798 as unconstitutional, largely because the Act was "levelled against
the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication among the people thereon." 4 ELIOTVS DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553-54 (1876), quoted in New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254,274 (1964).
40. See, e.g., Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 935-38 (1992) (contending that the media
should have a right of access greater than the general public to certain types
of government-controlled information).
41 Cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("[Tlhe press serves
and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by
governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping of-
ficials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were
elected to serve.").
42. See Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976). In Flor-
ida Publishing, a reporter accompanied emergency personnel into a burned
house and, at the fire departmenfs request, photographed the premises, in-
cluding the chalk outline of plaintiffs daughter, who had died in the fire. See
id. at 915-16. The court rejected trespass claims and held that custom and
usage created an implied consent for reporters to accompany emergency per-
sonnel. See id. at 918-19.
43. But see Kent R. Middleton, Journalists, Trespass, and Officials: Clos-
ing the Door on Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 259, 271-
85 (1989) (rejecting the argument in Florida Publishing that custom and us-
age create implied consent allowing media to accompany public officials into
private residences).
44. Cf. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,862 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("What is at stake here is the societal function of the First
1701
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should have increased access rights to private property. Locating
media access rights in the public's "right to know" information
that will prevent public and private abuses leads naturally to
the extension of access rights to private property. While the
Supreme Court has refused to extend press access rights be-
yond those of the general public,45 the Court has at times ac-
knowledged that press freedom depends in part on the ability
to access information.' The press serves an information gath-
ering function that derives from its right to publish,47 and there
is no reason why this function is served only when important
information is held by public sources.
For example, Desnick and Food Lion illustrate the media's
ability to uncover corruption and spur social reform. Assuming
the investigative reports in the Desnick and Food Lion cases
were correct,48 the media may have performed a valuable serv-
ice by exposing these business practices. And there is at least
a colorable argument that the information would not have been
exposed through ordinary investigative techniques. There may
also be other reasons to grant the media a qualified immunity
for surreptitious newsgathering on business premises. To the
extent that businesses dedicate portions of their property to
public use, they already may have demonstrated a willingness
to relinquish some private rights.49 In addition, many busi-
Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs.").
45. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (rejecting the ar-
gument that the First Amendment prevents members of the press from hav-
ing to disclose the identities of confidential sources to a grand jury).
46. See id. at 681 ("[Wlithout some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.").
47. See Tom A. Collins, The Press Clause Construed in Context. The Jour-
nalists' Right of Access to Places, 52 Mo. L. REv. 751, 757 (1987) (describing
the information gathering function as essential to fulfilling the media's consti-
tutional function of disseminating information to the public).
48. While the plaintiffs in Desnick sued for defamation for certain state-
ments made in the course of the broadcast, they did not contend that many
other charges, including the charge of performing unnecessary surgery, were
false. See Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1349 (7th Cir. 1995). Food Lion did
not sue for libel. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp.
956, 959 (M.D.N.C. 1996). Of course, the increased hurdles plaintiffs in libel
and defamation cases must overcome, see supra notes 17-18 and accompany-
ing text, might explain plaintiffs' hesitancy to bring these claims.
49. For example, "closely regulated" businesses have a less legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context.
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). While that Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to commercial
property, "the warrant and probable cause requirements... have lessened
application." Id. However, note that this reduced expectation stems from the
1702 [Vol. 82:1695
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nesses, such as those in the restaurant and banking industries,
are already accustomed to being monitored by public and pri-
vate parties masquerading as patrons 0 Finally, at least some
businesses are engaged in matters of great public interest,
which may argue for subordinating their private rights to the
public's right to know.
2. The Cost to Private Rights Can Be Minimized
Obviously, any newsgathering privilege comes at the ex-
pense of the ability to enforce certain private rights. This Note
deals particularly with undercover investigations of busi-
nesses, in which context trespass is particularly important."
In an effort to minimi.e the sacrifice of private rights, some
have suggested that the newsgathering privilege arise only
where the media investigates the "work-related" activities of
those "engaged in public business," and even then only where
the media has "probable cause" to believe that the plaintiff was
engaged in "illegal, fraudulent, or potentially harmful activi-
ties."52 These limits recognize the possibility for abuse of the
newsgathering privilege and attempt to channel media behavior
into production of socially "useful" information.
3. Information Tends To Be Underproduced
Arguments for a newsgathering privilege may be sup-
ported by recognizing that media products have many charac-
teristics of public goods. 3 Because it is desirable to uncover
comprehensiveness of government regulation, see id., which cannot form the
basis for a media privilege to invade the property and also fails to distinguish
commercial from other private property; cf South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (justifying the "automobile exception" to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, in part, on the fact that comprehensive
government regulation reduces the expectation of privacy private citizens
have in their automobiles).
50. See Barnett, supra note 14, at 453.
51. Corporations cannot sue for invasion of privacy, see SACK & BARON,
supra note 2, at 574, but can sue for trespass. Individuals working at a busi-
ness, however, can certainly sue for invasion of privacy. Cf Desnick v. ABC,
44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (opthamalic clinic and two surgeons sue for tres-
pass and invasion of privacy).
52. See Barnett, supra note 14, at 449-52.
53. Public goods have two essential characteristics: nonexclusivity, which
occurs when providers cannot prevent nonpurchasers from using the good,
and nonrivairy, which occurs when use of the good by one person does not af-
fect any other person's ability to make similar use of the good. Cf Daniel A.
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amend-
ment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558-59 (1991) ("[Ihe benefits of information
1703
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fraud, corruption, and unsafe business practices, courts should
be skeptical of newsgathering tort actions; after all, these suits
aim to suppress the production of information that is likely to
be underproduced in the first place.' In fact, if behavior with
First Amendment implications is produced at less than optimal
levels, perhaps that behavior should be subsidized.5
The argument for a qualified press immunity thus relies
on a number of assumptions: that the press serves a special
role as gatherer and disseminator of information,56 which is at
the heart of the First Amendment; that businesses have a less
legitimate claim to the full exercise of property rights than pri-
vate individuals and are engaged in activities about which the
public has a legitimate right to know;57 that any privilege can
be successfully limited;58 that the current state of affairs is so
uncertain that reporters and editors, fearful of massive tort liabil-
ity, will engage in "rational self-censorship" and forgo surrep-
titious newsgathering efforts;59 and, finally, that this additional
"chilling" of investigative activity must be evaluated with the
knowledge that information is already underproduced ° To
begin to evaluate these assumptions, it is important to under-
stand how courts approach newsgathering tort cases. The re-
mainder of this Note, therefore, describes the current case law
cannot be restricted to direct purchasers, but inevitably spread to larger
groups.... Because the producer does not consider these benefits in his pro-
duction decision, less information is produced than is socially optimal."). Pro-
fessor Farber does not argue for a newsgathering privilege but suggests that
the constitutional protections for speech reflect an awareness that informa-
tion is a public good. See id. at 555-57.
54. Cf. C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 311, 316-19 (1997) (discussing the public good aspects of media products);
see also Farber, supra note 53. Neither of these authors is discussing a news-
gathering privilege.
55. Cf Farber, supra note 53, at 571 (likening some First Amendmentjurisprudence to speech subsidies). Professor Farber likens the invalidation of
content-neutral rules to a speech subsidy:
Decisions that invalidate content-neutral rules can also be viewed as
forced subsidies of speech by onlookers, who must contend with in-
creased traffic, littering, noise, or other costs. Because information is
underproduced, a subsidy of this type is desirable. As long as limiting
content-neutral restrictions on speech spreads costs widely and
thinly, it remains a reasonably equitable way of providing a subsidy.
Id.
56. See Barnett, supra note 14, at 443.
57. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
58. See supra Part I.B.2.
59. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 443.
60. See supra Part I.B.3.
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in this area and questions the validity of the assumptions under-
lying the newsgathering privilege.
II. CASE LAW AND THE USE(LESSNESS) OF THE
"BALANCING" DISTINCTION
A. THE SUPREME COURT: COLLAPSING SPEECH AND PRESS
While the Supreme Court has never interpreted the Press
Clause as granting rights in excess of individual speech
rights,6' the Court has not explicitly ruled out such a treat-
ment.6 2 Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the Court would
grant privileged status to the press absent extremely unusual
circumstances. The Court has repeatedly held that the media
are not immune from laws of general applicability. 63 The media,
for example, may be sued for breach of contract for breaking a
promise not to reveal a source's identity. 6 The press has no
greater access rights to jails and prisons than the general public.65
Nor does the press have greater access to pretrial proceed-
ings.' And, while the Supreme Court has held that criminal
61. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 16.19 (5th ed. 1995) (discussing the Coures jurisprudence in
this area and noting that, as of yet, the Court has not granted to the press ac-
cess rights in excess of those enjoyed by the general public). Occasionally,
individual justices have intimated that the press may sometimes have rights
greater than individual speech rights. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("he press has a preferred position
in our constitutional scheme.., to bring fulfillment to the public's right to
know."); Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (arguing
that the press serves a separate, structural role as a counterweight to gov-
ernment power).
62. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 455,459 (1983)
63. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding
that the First Amendment does not immunize a journalist who breaches a
promise of confidentiality to a source); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665(1972) (holding that First Amendment does not prevent state from requiringjournalist to testify before grand jury about information gathered from confi-
dential sources).
64. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665.
65. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (holding that the Con-
stitution does not require the state "to make available to journalists sources of
information not available to members of the public generally"); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding regulations prohibiting
media interviews of specific individual inmates).
66. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (upholding trialjudge's order closing, at defendants' request, pretrial proceedings to the public
1705
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trials must, absent an overriding interest, be open to the public,
it has refused to grant preferential access rights to the media. 7
These decisions reflect the Court's tendency to treat uniformly
the First Amendment's separate references to speech and
press. To date, where the Court has granted access rights to
information within the government's control, it has not limited
those rights to the press. 8
B. THE "HOSTILITY" OF TORT LAW TO NEWSGATHERING
1. To Balance or Not To Balance-A Distinction Without a
Difference
Commentators reviewing lower court treatment of news-
gathering tort cases frequently distinguish between courts that
adopt a "balancing" approach, in which First Amendment press
freedoms are weighed against privacy interests, and courts
that eschew such an approach. 9 On the surface, this distinc-
tion appears meaningful. Courts that are willing explicitly to
weigh competing privacy and press freedoms ought to tolerate
a wider variety of press newsgathering misconduct than those
that engage in a standard tort analysis. But the distinction is
far more superficial than it seems.
Some courts state outright whether a balancing analysis is
appropriate." Depending on one's perspective, these courts are
and press).
67. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding,
in six separate opinions, that the First Amendment requires that criminal
trials be open to the public absent an overriding interest). In Richmond
Newspapers, Justice Stevens suggested that the holding might possibly ex-
tend beyond the criminal or civil trial context, to situations in which the gov-
ernment has arbitrarily interfered with "access to important information." Id.
at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring). And Justice Brennan might have accepted
superior media access privileges in certain circumstances: "Since the media's
right of access is at least that of the general public... [the] state statute un-
constitutionally restricts public access to trials." Id. at 582 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
68. Cf. Anderson, supra note 62, at 456-59 (describing the Supreme
Coures refusal to give the press more protection under the Press Clause than
individuals enjoy under the Speech Clause).
69. See John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin:
The Constitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication of Ill-Gotten
Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1111, 1124-27 (1996) (comparing
"balancing" cases unfavorably to cases that refuse to consider arguments that
the First Amendment immunizes some media misconduct); Barnett, supra
note 14, at 439-42 (discussing the difference between courts that balance First
Amendment interests and those that do not).
70. Compare Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Of
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either behaving "generously" or are "creating dangerously
subjective and ad hoc exceptions" to the "general rules of liability
and damages. " 2 However, despite the broad language favoring
or rejecting a balancing approach in these cases, it is unclear
whether the approach taken has any predictive power. In fact,
were the opinions edited to remove the few statements that
explicitly deal with balancing First Amendment and privacy
interests, the analyses would appear almost identical.
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,' the Ninth Circuit refused to
balance First Amendment and private rights and upheld an
invasion of privacy claim against reporters who used hidden
cameras and microphones to record an encounter with a dis-
abled veteran who purported to heal using clay, minerals,
herbs, and various "gadgets." The veteran practiced out of his
home, did not advertise or charge for his services, and did not
hold his home open to the public.7 4 The reporters used a ruse to
gain entrance to the home and had even agreed with the police
to obtain pictures to use as evidence against the veteran, in
addition to photos for publication.75 While the court explicitly
rejected the argument that the First Amendment in any way
insulated the media's conduct,76 few of the concerns implicating
the First Amendment were present. Since the veteran did not
serve the general public and did not charge for the services he
provided, the reporters could hardly claim to be protecting the
course legitimate countervailing social needs may warrant some intrusion de-
spite an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy."), Scheetz v. The
Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (dismissing inva-
sion of privacy claims and stating that "[blefore this court can balance these
[First Amendment and privacy] rights, it notes that balancing is legitimate"),
affd, 986 F.2d 202 (3rd. Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs did not have a con-
stitutional privacy interest sufficient to maintain a § 1983 action) and Schul-
man v. Group W Prod's., Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 850, 875 (1996) ("[A]n individ-
ual's right to privacy must be weighed and balanced against the public's right
to news and information."), with Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249
(9th Cir. 1971) (MThe First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or
to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office.")
and Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1913, 1913 (N.Y. 1978)
(stating that the "First Amendment is not a shibboleth before which all other
rights must succumb").
71. Barnett, supra note 14, at 440.
72. Walsh et al., supra note 69, at 1126.
73. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
74. See id. at 245-46.
75. See id.
76. See supra note 70.
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public from fraud. Had the court applied a balancing analysis,
it would likely have arrived at the same result.
This pattern continues in cases that purport to weigh the
First Amendment interests against the private interests pro-
tected by the tort. In Galella v. Onassis,' the Second Circuit
upheld an injunction against a photographer who had doggedly
followed and photographed Jaqueline Onassis.8 Although
Galella's photography occurred mostly in public places, Galella
intrusively photographed Mrs. Onassis engaged in personal
activities that were of little public import and in situations in
which she had a reasonable expectation of privacy.79 While at
times the court acknowledged that it had to weigh the value of
the First Amendment interests claimed by Galella,0 its analy-
sis appears to be totally unaffected."' Except for a brief men-
tion of the importance of First Amendment interests, the case
is analytically indistinguishable from a "non-balancing" case.
Schulman v. Group W Products, Inc.2 provides a more
complex example. The plaintiff in that case suffered an acci-
dent in which her car overturned on an expressway. 3 Fire-
fighters, police, and other rescue personnel came to the scene,
and the media's presence could be justified as serving the im-
portant public interest in monitoring public officials in the per-
formance of their duties.m While the court acknowledged a
First Amendment interest in press coverage of accidents and
catastrophes, 5 its decision is easily accommodated by a stan-
77. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
78. See id. at 992.
79. Galella was ultimately held to have violated an injunction requiring
him to maintain a certain distance from Mrs. Onassis by, among other things,
renting a fishing boat to take photographs of Onassis vacationing at Marfha's
Vineyard. See Galella v. Onassis, 533 F. Supp. 1076, 1089-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
80. See supra note 70.
8L See Galella, 487 F.2d at 995-96. The court did agree that the defen-
dant's First Amendment interest was of some merit, but concluded:
When weighed against the de minimus public importance of... [Mrs.
Onassis], Galella's constant surveillane ... was unwarranted and
unreasonable.... Galena does not seriously dispute the court's find-
ing of tortious conduct. Rather, he sets up the First Amendment as a
wall of immunity protecting newsmen from any liability for their con-
duct while gathering news. There is no such scope to the First
Amendment right.
Id. at 995.
82. 51 Cal. App. 4th 850 (1996).
83. See id. at 862.
84. See id. at 866.
85. See id. at 875; see also supra note 70 (citing the court's explicit adop-
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dard tort analysis. The court upheld summary judgment
against Ms. Schulman's invasion of privacy claim while she
was at the accident scene itself and was audible to and in full
view of a large crowd of spectators. 6 No reference to the First
Amendment is needed to reach this conclusion. To prevail on
an invasion of privacy claim, a plaintiff must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy." Ms. Schulman had no such expecta-
tion."8
However, the court determined that Ms. Schulman had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the helicopter on the way
to the hospital, and thus reversed summary judgment for her
claims arising during the flight.89 Her expectation was legiti-
mate even though the public had a valid interest in monitoring
the work of "air rescue paramedics licensed by the county." 0
Superficially, this decision reflects a "balancing" approach.
While Ms. Schulman was lying on the street, the public's right
to know outweighed her privacy interest, which was weakened
by her exposure to the public. In the helicopter, her reduced
exposure to the public led the court to conclude that Ms.
Schulman's privacy interest outweighed the public's legitimate
interest in the provision of public services. But this result is no
different from that reached by a tort analysis that is even re-
motely sensitive to whether the rights underlying the tort were
infringed.9 On the street, plaintiff had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. In the helicopter, she did.Y
tion of a "balancing" approach).
86. See Schulman, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 875-76.
87. See id. at 873.
88. See id. at 875-76.
89. See id. at 878-82.
90. Id. at 889 (also reversing summary judgment against plaintiffs claim
for publication of private facts).
91. Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, a plaintiff has no claim
for invasion of privacy. See supra text accompanying note 87. While trespass
actions are typically more formalistic, see supra notes 23-26 and accompany-
ing text (describing trespass analysis as formalistic; for example, nominal
damages are appropriate even where no damage results from the trespass), a
slightly more functional trespass analysis will allow the media to escape liabil-
ity where no established rights are infringed. For an example of this more
functional tort analysis, see Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir.
1995), which rejected trespass and invasion of privacy claims because none of
the interests protected by the tort, including protection from invasion of pri-
vate space, maintenance of order on the premises, and protection from reve-
lation of intimate details, were infringed by defendants' surreptitious record-
ing.
92. The court even acknowledged that introducing First Amendment con-
cerns did not necessarily change the result: "Thus, in regard to the issues
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The cases demonstrate not that the adoption of a balancing
approach is totally irrelevant, but that whether a court "balances"
or not often has little impact on the analysis. Courts tend to ex-
plicitly reject the media's First Amendment arguments in those
cases where the First Amendment interests are least at stake.
The "balancing/non-balancing" distinction is thus driven more
by the content of the lawsuit than by the court's analytical
bent.9 3
2. Is Tort Law Unduly Hostile to Newsgathering Interests?
Whether a court "balances" First Amendment and privacy
interests is not really the question. Tort law also "balances" in
that it represents a series of loose empirical judgments about
the manner in which legal rules affect socially desirable behavior. 4
Furthermore, the notion that tort law is insensitive to the First
Amendment is not necessarily true. Newsgathering tort cases al-
low the media substantial flexibility in deciding how to investi-
which we find determinative here-whether appellants had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy and whether their claims are outweighed by a competing
First Amendment interest-the two causes of action are identical." Id- at 875.
For another example of the similarity between "balancing" and "non-
balancing" analyses, see Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515,
1527 (E.D. Pa. 1990), where the court dismissed an invasion of privacy claim
brought by a policeman and his wife against a newspaper that had obtained a
confidential police report detailing a complaint for domestic assault filed by
the officer's wife. The newspaper ran two stories that divulged the complaint
against the policeman, who had been named "Officer of the Year." See id. at
1517. The Court determined that plaintiffs privacy interests were out-
weighed by the First Amendment interests, because a significant number of
people already knew of the alleged incident and because the articles focusedprimarily on the police department's actions. See id. at 1528. While the court
engaged explicitly in balancing First Amendment and privacy interests, its
decision rested in large part on the fact that, because the incident was widely
known within the police department and, to a more limited extent, in the sur-
rounding community, the plaintiffis expectation of privacy was largely at-
tenuated. See id. at 1530-32.
93. While Dietemann is typical of "nonbalancing" cases, courts occasion-
ally refuse to "balance" in cases where the decision could conceivably have
made a difference. For example, an Oklahoma court upheld a criminal tres-
pass conviction against reporters who accompanied protesters onto the site of
a proposed nuclear facility. See Stahl v. Oklahoma, 665 P.2d 839 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1983). Presumably, this court would also have upheld a civil trespass
claim, although the media could claim to be following an act of civil disobedi-
ence, surely a matter of significant public import. Of course, the protest could
also have been monitored, though less effectively, from outside the premises,
but the court gives no indication that the presence of less intrusive newsgath-
ering alternatives is a prerequisite to a finding of media liability.
94. See infra notes 154, 160 and accompanying text (describing the use of
proximate cause to optimally deter accidents).
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gate. For example, newsgathering on public streets is typically
protected, so long as performed with reasonable discretion,
even when observing activity on private property." Even
newsgathering in semi-public places is protected, again so long
as performed with reasonable discretion 6 And journalists typi-
cally do not become liable for newsgathering on public portions
of private businesses, at least where the newsgathering con-
duct does not disrupt the business's operation. 7
Newsgathering tort cases also use the notion of consent to
favor newsgatherers. Consent is a defense to trespass and in-
trusion and can be either express or implied. Consent may be
implied if local "custom and practice" is to allow certain types
of media access to private property.Y In most contexts, the no-
tion of implied consent raises few eyebrows. In some cases,
however, courts strain to expand the doctrine of implied con-
sent to accommodate media newsgathering interests.' °°
For example, even fraudulently induced consent may be
sufficient to defeat a trespass claim.' ' Courts are also likely to
95. See, e.g., Mark v. King Broadcasting Co., 618 P.2d 512 (Wash. App.
1980), affd, 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982)
(finding no claim for invasion of privacy where plaintiff was photographed in-
side his pharmacy from outside the front window).
96. See, e.g., Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(dismissing intrusion upon seclusion claim because plaintiff was interviewed
in semi-public area and because the interview, while aggressive, was confined
to one incident; also dismissing trespass claim on notion of implied consent to
the reporter's presence).
97. Compare the Desnick facts, supra note 10-13 and accompanying text,
with those inLe Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1913 (N.Y. 1978).
InLe Mistral, a New York court upheld a trespass verdict against a media de-
fendant whose camera crew entered a restaurant during business hours,
greatly disrupting the operation of the business. See id. at 1913 & n.1. The
Prime Time Live reporters in Desnick merely posed as patients and did not dis-
rupt the clinic's business in any way. See Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1352
(7th Cir. 1995).
98. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 87 (1964).
99. See, e.g., Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 918-19 (Fla.
1976) (custom and usage creates implied consent for reporters to accompany
emergency personnel).
100. For example, a California court dismissed a trespass claim after
plaintiff "consented" to the presence of a film crew at her home after she
called the police to report a domestic assault. See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F.
Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
10L See id. at 756-57. The court also held that the camera crew did not
exceed the scope of the plaintiffs consent: "If they exceeded the scope of [her]
consent, they did so by broadcasting the videotape, an act which occurred af-
ter they left [her] property and which cannot support a trespass claim." Id. at
756-57. The court was obviously sensitive to newsgathering interests.
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imply consent where camera crews accompany emergency offi-
cials"02 or police officers on searches or emergency calls. 3 Of
course, none of these plaintiffs actually consented to the me-
dia's presence, and there is no reason to suppose they would
have done so had they been given the chance. In the context
involved here, where a reporter poses as a customer or an em-
ployee to gain access to places or information from which he
would otherwise be excluded, the concept of implied consent is
misleading.1" Consent by implication arises, in almost any
context, where a party has not expressly consented and would
almost certainly refuse to do so if asked.105 Nevertheless,
While the court might have been correct that broadcasting is an act sepa-
rate from the trespass, it does not follow that publication of material in ex-
press defiance of a condition upon which consent was granted does not create
liability. At the very least, this behavior should support liability in contract.
The media can be explicitly denied consent by a homeowner, despite custom
and usage permitting media entry. See Florida Publ'g, 340 So. 2d. at 918. If
property owners may deny consent to the media, owners can logically condi-
tion their consent upon the reporter's promise not to publish. Consent to en-
ter is presumably of value to the would-be trespasser, who surrenders the
privilege to publish as consideration for the right to enter the premises. No
breach of contract claim was made, however, in Baugh.
102. The principal case in this area is Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher,
340 So. 2d. 914 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977), which
rejected an intrusion claim where a photographer accompanied a fire Mar-
shall into a home destroyed by fire and, at the Marshall's request, photo-
graphed a chalk outline where plaintiffs daughter, who was killed in the fire,
had lain. The plaintiff was away, and learned of her daughter's death when
the photographs were published in defendantfs newspaper.
103. See Berger v. Hamilton, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1757 (D. Mont. 1996)
(dismissing trespass claim against camera crew that accompanied federal
agents on search of plaintiffs land, because government was in temporary
control of land during search and had granted the crew permission to be
there).
104. In Desnick, Judge Posner described the use of implied consent as a
tool for balancing competing interests, see Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345,
1351-52 (7th Cir. 1995), and stated, "there can be no implied consent in any
nonfictitious sense of the term when express consent is procured by a misrep-
resentation or misleading omission," id. at 1351.
105. Justice Holmes provides a useful and analogous discussion of con-
structive presence in conspiracy cases:
To speak of constructive presence is to use the language of fiction,
and so to hinder precise analysis. When a man is said to be con-
structively present where the consequences of an act done elsewhere
are felt, it is meant that for some special purpose he will be treated
as he would have been treated if he had been present, although he
was not. For instance, if a man, acting in one state, sets forces in
motion that kill a man in another.., the latter state is very likely to
say that, if it can catch him, it will punish him, although he was not
subject to its laws when he did the act.... He was not present in
fact, and in theory of law he was present only so far as to be charged
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courts often use consent to relieve the media of liability for oth-
erwise tortious newsgathering conduct.
Yet another option exists for courts that seek to accommo-
date reasonable newsgathering behavior without relieving the
media of tort liability. Courts can engage in a more functional
tort analysis, one that is sensitive to whether the media's be-
havior actually infringed any rights protected by the tort. The
Seventh Circuit's decision in Desnick, for example, was based
not on First Amendment grounds but on functional tort consid-
erations. Simply put, there was no invasion of any of the
"specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect.""6
The same was true of the interests protected by the privacy
tort.107
In this respect, the Food Lion decision is distinguishable,
and rightly decided."8 Food Lion's property interests were un-
doubtedly infringed by having people hostile to the company's
interests invade the private areas of the store. The plaintiffs in
Desnick, on the other hand, were recorded by people posing as
customers during normal business hours.'01 No information
was recorded that could not have been recorded by any patient,
and it cannot be said that recording the information accurately
with a camera infringes property or privacy rights that are
otherwise intact.1'
with the act.
Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 386 (1909).
106. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352. The Desnick court noted that the offices
were open to the general public, the videotaped encounters were completely
professional and no personal information was revealed, the offices were not
disrupted in any way, no intimate details of the plaintiffs' private lives were
exposed, and no trade secrets were stolen. See id. at 1352-53.
107. See id. at 1353.
108. The defendants in Food Lion, unlike those in Desnick, gave false in-
formation to obtain jobs at the store and entered areas that were closed to the
general public. See 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 (M.D.N.C. 1996). The Desnick
court upheld summary judgment on the fraud complaint, because the defen-
dants' promises (not to engage in undercover surveillance, among others) were
ultimately harmless and failed to constitute a "scheme" to defraud as required
by Illinois law. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1354-55.
109. See id. at 1352.
110. See id. Admittedly, the Desnick decision could easily have turned out
differently if a few facts were changed. If, for example, the reporters had dis-
rupted the office's activities or had recorded and published intimate details of
the plaintiffs lives, even the Desnick court would have ruled differently.
However, this is exactly the point. Had either happened, interests protected
by the trespass and invasion of privacy torts would clearly have been impli-
cated. Were that the case, there would obviously have been a way for the
media to conduct its business in a less intrusive manner. The standard tort
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Clearly, many courts apply tort law quite flexibly to ac-
cominmodate reasonable newsgathering behavior. However, the
cases are not uniform, and media advocates fear that the lack
of uniformity will "chill" important investigative activity."' To
counteract this chilling effect, these advocates suggest that
courts grant the media a qualified privilege to commit torts
while gathering news."2 The remainder of this Note will evalu-
ate the arguments that might support such a privilege."'
Ill. THE (UNTESTED) ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING
THE NEWSGATHERING PRIVILEGE
A. The Ambiguous Text and History of the First Amendment
Any attempt to create a newsgathering privilege must be
grounded in policy rather than Supreme Court precedent or
the text and legislative history of the First Amendment. It is
tempting to cite the Amendment's separate references to
speech and press"' as evidence that the Framers intended the
press to occupy a unique position. Although treating the
Speech and Press Clauses identically might render the explicit
reference to the press meaningless,"5 the Amendment's text
does not yield so unambiguous a meaning. Redundancy is
hardly unheard of in constitutional interpretation,"6 and the
Press Clause may merely emphasize free speech principles in
the press context without granting any special privileges to the
organized media. Likewise, there is no reason to presume that
any constitutional distinction between speech and press, as-
analysis, in this case, reaches the right balance. However, granting to the
media a privilege to trespass would have removed the incentive to conduct an
investigation in the least intrusive manner possible.
11. Cf. supra note 30 and accompanying text (examining the effect of
large punitive damage awards on the newsgathering and reporting process).
112. See supra notes 16, 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the pro-
posal to offer a limited privilege to media).
113. See supra Part I.B (describing arguments for a newsgathering privi-
lege).
114. See supra note 1.
115. Cf. Stewart, supra note 61, at 633 ("If the Free Press guarantee
meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional re-
dundancy.").
116. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 585 (1994) (describing the Con-
stitution as "full of redundancies" and citing as potential examples the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
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suming there to be one, assigns more substantial First
Amendment rights to the press. The text of the Amendment
may support an analytical distinction between speech and
press; it does not supply the content of that distinction."
7
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amend-
ment likewise provides soil too infertile to support a newsgath-
ering privilege."' While the Amendment sweepingly prohibits
regulation of speech and press activity, the Supreme Court did
not apply First Amendment principles to the torts of libel and
slander until its 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van."9 Since that time, while the Court has provided an in-
creasing amount of protection for speech that would formerly
have been tortious,20 it has never granted to the press rights in
excess of those enjoyed by the general public. 121
Nor can a newsgathering privilege be grounded in a coher-
ent theory of the Framers' intent in crafting the First Amend-
ment. Historians have debated the extent to which the Fram-
ers intended to protect the press from government
intervention-whether they merely intended to prohibit prior
restraints while leaving the law of seditious libel intact'" or
whether they believed that press freedom was essential to rep-
resentative self-government.'3 This line of inquiry is likely to
117. Cf. Collins, supra note 47, at 758 ("[Elither the press clause is an em-
phasis (perhaps redundant) of the first amendment or the press clause states
a separate right....").
118. See supra Part I.A.
119. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring public officials to prove "actual
malice" to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to their official
conduct).
120. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (requiring showing of
"actual malice" for even private plaintiffs to recover for false light invasion of
privacy where discussion of public matters was concerned); see also SACK &
BARON, supra note 2, at 1-37 (describing evolution of "actual malice" doctrine
from 1964 to 1991).
121. See Anderson, supra note 62, at 456 (1983) (describing cases in which
the Supreme Court has denied to the press special rights not available under
the speech clause).
122. See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
123. See Anderson, supra note 62, at 533 (arguing against Levy's interpre-
tation and concluding that the Framers possessed, to varying degrees, the no-
tion that press freedom was essential to representative self-government). The
proper interpretation of the press clause is beyond the scope, and competence,
of this Note. For criticism of Professor Levy's influential thesis, see Merrill
Jensen, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 456, 457 (1961) (claiming that
"[diespite the law, there was freedom of expression in fact"). Professor Levy
later revised his conception of the First Amendment to conclude that, while
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yield few answers. Ascribing a single intent to a legislative
body is an-impossibly complicated task, '24 especially when ap-
plied to the drafters of the First Amendment,"' whose work
still had to be ratified by the states. Perhaps the most that can
be safely ascribed to the Framers is a belief that regulation of
the press was best left to post-publication lawsuits. If so, this
belief cannot form the basis of a journalist's privilege to commit
torts while gathering the news.
Of course, even if all agreed about what the drafters meant
by "freedom of the press," there is no inherent reason why their
intentions should control modern interpretation. Times and
technology have changed, and the First Amendment must be
"restated and reiterated not only for each generation, but for
each new situation.' 26 Whether, and in what circumstances,
the First Amendment can trump other private rights should be
resolved by balancing the functional concerns underlying the
rights at stake. To that end, a thorough evaluation of the as-
sumptions underlying a newsgathering privilege is required.
B. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS UNDERLYING THE
NEWSGATHERING IMMUNITY
1. The Extent of the Public's Right to Know
Arguments for a newsgathering privilege must weigh ac-
cess to information heavily in a First Amendment calculus. 27
However, these arguments are weakened to the extent the
First Amendment protects the right to contribute to, rather
than receive from, the available pool of information. If the
First Amendment merely protects the ability to contribute to
the pool of information or speech, then information gathering is
no more indispensable for the reporter than for any other per-
the doctrine of seditious libel remained intact, the American press had become
so bold, and the scope of political discourse had become so broad, that the
press was practically beyond the doctrine's reach. See LEONARD W. LEVY,
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); see also Leonard W. Levy, The Legacy
Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REv. 767, 768 (1985).
124- See generally RONALD DwORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 317-27 (describing
difficulties in identifying legislative intent).
125. Cf. id. at 359-63 (describing similar difficulties in determining the
framers' intent in constitutional interpretation).
126. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 894 (1963).
127. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (describing the role in-
formation plays in theories of the First Amendment).
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son exercising First Amendment rights. The media's ability to
publish is no more dependent on access to information than the
ordinary person's right to speak. Instead, arguments for spe-
cial First Amendment status for the media must focus on the
increased benefit the public derives from the media's superior
ability to investigate and disseminate. ' This benefit comes in
the form of increased access to information and is properly lo-
cated in the general public instead of in the media that fulfill
the demand for information.
So located, the access right loses some of its First Amend-
ment luster. Granting the press minor tort immunity has doc-
trinal implications deserving of far more attention than they
have received. Even the "balancing" cases described above
rarely explain precisely how they are balancing private and
press interests."9 In effect, allowing the media to engage in
tortious behavior imposes costs upon the public whose inter-
ests the media is claimed to serve. Forcing the public, osten-
sibly in its own interest, to subsidize newsgathering behavior
is not a decision to be undertaken lightly.
Even the "easy" cases for press newsgathering immunity
are more complicated than they appear. Take, for example, a
situation where reporters accompany police or emergency res-
cue personnel onto private property.3 ' Here, the press dis-
seminates to the public information about the manner in which
public servants perform their duties. However, it is somewhat
odd to justify intrusions onto private property by reference to the
press's value in monitoring the public officials who have invited
128. One such benefit is the increased scrutiny faced by public officials
whose activities are exposed to the public eye. See supra text accompanying
notes 39-41.
129. But see Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1527-34
(E.D. Pa. 1990), for a rare exception. The Scheetz plaintiffs sued based on a
publication revealing the identities of the police "Officer of the Year" and his
wife, and criticizing the police investigation of the wife's spousal abuse com-
plaint. See id. at 1517. The Scheetz court identified two public values served
by the press's disclosure of the confidential police report-questioning the
wisdom of the police department's choice of Officer of the Year and the ade-
quacy of their investigation of one of their own officers-and compared these
interests to the plaintiffs' interests in confidentiality and autonomy. See id. at
1528-32. Of course, the privacy interests were greatly reduced by the fact
that the incident was widely-known among the police officers, and may have
been witnessed by a number of others. See id. at 1530-32. The court ac-
knowledged that the plaintiffs lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, so it
is hard to see how their privacy rights were infringed, regardless of the defen-
dant's First Amendment status. See id. at 1532
130. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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them there."' The typical view of the press is as a counter-
weight to abuse of official power, but few of the cases actually
present this picture. Instead, the cases present a picture of
media and government working hand in hand.' The press's
ability to check official abuse and disseminate information
about the delivery of public services is almost nonexistent here.
The police are hardly likely to invite the press to attend a
beating or warrantless search, and public officials will have in-
centives to monitor their behavior carefiully when the press ac-
companies them.
Given these incentives, the "informed public" justification
would seem to require public officials to allow the media to accom-
pany them on official business, at least where the media's pres-
ence would not disrupt the provision of public services. No one,
however, advances this argument. There are clearly costs as-
sociated with allowing the press to accompany emergency offi-
cials onto private property.' The benefits of monitoring the
government may be less substantial than they initially would
appear, especially if the media can be excluded without a
showing that its presence would be disruptive.3 4 If so, the net
result of a balancing of First Amendment and private rights
may weigh against press immunity even in those cases where
such immunity seems most appropriate. It is even less likely
that the media merit immunity for tortious conduct on private
property that occurs without consent from public officials. Any
interpretation of the press clause would surely assign more
constitutional significance to the monitoring of public, as op-
posed to private, activity and persons.'35
131. In Florida Publishing, facts supra note 42, the camera crew was not
only invited to accompany the police, but was also asked to take photographs
of the chalk-outlined body. See Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914,
918 (Fla. 1976).
132. See id.; see also Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir.
1971) (noting a situation where the press actually conspired with the police to
record plaintiffs quackery for use as evidence).
133. At the least, these costs include a reduced ability to exercise private
rights through trespass and intrusion actions. For a somewhat different ex-
ample of the costs of media access, see Florida Publishing, 340 So. 2d at 916,
where the plaintiff learned of her daughter's death when photographs of the
chalk outline of the daughter's body were published in defendant's newspaper.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 130-132.
135. The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence certainly re-
flects this fact in other ways. Public officials, public figures, and people who
temporarily lose their private status by experiencing general fame and notori-
ety must prove "actual malice" to prevail in a defamation action. Compare
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2. Is Tortious Newsgathering Already Overproduced?
Undoubtedly, the Food Lion investigation uncovered so-
cially valuable information. Assuming information about sani-
tation practices is not available through some other investiga-
tive technique, allowing tort suits in similar circumstances
may "chill" media investigation. But such "chilling" will not
necessarily reduce newsgathering to a less-than-optimal level.
While many types of information may be underproduced,'36
there is actually little reason to suppose that tortiously pro-
duced information is one of them. All information is costly to
generate, but information derived from tortious behavior im-
poses substantial costs on third parties-costs which producers
will not take into account when making production decisions. 37
In fact, because much of the cost of tortious newsgathering is
externalized, such behavior is likely to be overproduced, be-
cause the media need not consider these costs when deciding to
investigate. And, unlike most other cost-externalizing forms of
First Amendment expression, the costs of tortious newsgather-
iug are potentially substantial and narrowly distributed.'38
This is not to say that the press is completely inattentive
to the costs its investigations may impose on third parties.
Many media organizations operate under self-imposed ethical
standards that serve to reduce these costs. '39 However, it is
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring public officials to
prove that defendant made a defamatory statement with malice) and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (requiring public figures to demon-
strate actual malice to prevail in an action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress), with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)
(holding that those who "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular pub-
lic controversies" would have to prove actual malice, but states were free to
apply any standard except strict liability to defamation of private parties).
However, private citizens do not become "public figures" merely by becoming
peripherally involved in a matter of public interest. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at
351-52.
136. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
137. Cf. Farber, supra note 53, at 562 ("Like any other activity, speech may
impose costs on third parties, and when these externalities exceed the total
social value of the speech, regulation may be in order.").
138. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 53, at 571 (describing how exercise of
First Amendment rights externalizes costs in the form of "increased traffic,
littering, noise, [and] other costs"). Professor Farber describes the invalida-
tion of content-neutral rules as forcing third parties to subsidize this cost-
externalizing speech. See id. This subsidy "remains ... reasonably equitable"
so long as it "spreads costs widely and thinly." Id.
139. See Lynn Wickham Hartmann, Standards Governing the News: Their
Use, Their Character, and Their Legal Implications, 72 IOWA L. REV. 637(1987) (describing the history and then current use of written journalistic
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questionable whether ethical obligations are powerful enough
to override the desire to enter the profitable world of investi-
gative journalism.' In the increasingly competitive news
world, investigative news magazines are proliferating rap-
idly.14'
More importantly, it is not necessarily true that tort suits
against the media "chill" the overall level of investigative activ-
ity. Media enterprises have many ways to gather information,
and resources not devoted to certain types of undercover expo-
s6s may be spent on other information-gathering techniques.
It is even possible that those techniques produce information of
more First Amendment value. "Chilling," therefore, might
more aptly be called "redirecting," and a determination of
whether any (hypothesized) redirection of media resources has
a result contrary to the First Amendment is a necessary pre-
cursor to granting a newsgathering privilege.
3. How Well Suited Is the Media To Perform It's First
Amendment Function?
Granting to the media a newsgathering privilege from tort
suits presumably reflects the media's superior ability to fulfill
its First Amendment function of gathering and disseminating
information. But should this superior ability justify the me-
dia in gathering any information it chooses? If not, we might
tie a newsgathering privilege to the gathering of information of
First Amendment significance. A starting point is to note how
difficult it is to agree on what types of information are central
to the First Amendment.'43 However one defines information
standards and determining that newspapers use written standards despite
the chance that those standards will be used against the paper in litigation).
140. In fact, when ABC commenced its Food Lion investigation, the ABC
News Policy Manual provided that "news gathering of whatever sort does not
include any license to violate the law." Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 814 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
14L See Thomas D. Yannucci, Debunking the "Big Chill"6Why Defamation
Suits by Corporations Are Consistent with the First Amendment, 39 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1187, 1189 (1995).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (discussing the media's in-
formation-gathering function and ability to root out corruption).
143. The "marketplace" model advocated by Justice Holmes would appear
to place few restrictions on the type of information favored by the First
Amendment, because the "best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Alexander Meiklejohn's
"self-governance" model, however, would assign more First Amendment value
to speech related to participation in democratic government. See MEIK-
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with First Amendment value, the media will determine what
types of activity merit investigation largely based on what
sells-an economic ground substantially unrelated to the pur-
poses of the First Amendment.'" In addition, if the media,
driven by competitive pressure, see expos6 reporting as a way
to increase profits, there is already substantial incentive to en-
gage in such activity.'45 Providing an additional incentive in
the form of a newsgathering "privilege" may encourage exces-
sive use of investigative reporting at the expense of reporting
information of more First Amendment value.
Advocates of a newsgathering privilege might see the me-
dia as watchdogs whose interests are adverse to those of their
investigative targets. Ideally, the media would select matters
of substantial public interest to investigate. But it is not nec-
essarily the case that the media will select for investigation
those targets whose behavior is most contrary to the public in-
terest. Investigative targets could instead be selected for their
neutrality and lack of affiliation with the media enterprise.
For example, businesses that provide substantial advertising
revenue to media sources have long been treated with kid
gloves.1" Occasionally, competing interests may even use the
media against each other. The Food Lion complaint alleged
that a disgruntled union suggested to ABC that Food Lion
would make a good investigative target, perhaps in retaliation
for Food Lion's successful resistance of unionization. 47 These
LEJOHN, supra note 38.
144. For example, scandal that most people would consider unrelated to
the justifications for allowing free speech may have substantial economic
value to the press. See LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: How ATTACH
JOURNALISM HAS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 56 (1993) ( [E]xecutives
are not unaware of the experiences of newspapers such as the Washington
Times, where screaming front-page headlines about Barney Frank and an un-
related homosexual 'call boy' scandal boosted newsstand sales by 25 percent in
the summer of 1989.").
145. The press face substantial competitive pressures, and "exposure"
shows of dubious First Amendment value are seen by networks as a means to
increase profits. See Yannucci, supra note 141, at 1189-92 (1995).
146. See DOUG UNDERWOOD, WHEN MBAs RULE THE NEWSROOM: HOW
THE MARKETERS AND MANAGERS ARE RESHAPING TODAY'S MEDIA 133-38
(1993) (describing the tendency for newspapers, at least, to treat as "sacred
cows" retail and real estate advertisers and large companies located in the
same city as the newspapers).
147. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811
(M.D.N.C. 1995). The complaint alleged that the United Food and Commer-
cial Workers International Union (UFCW) suggested that ABC investigate
Food Lion. See id, at 814. The UFCW had been trying, without success, to
organize Food Lion employees for more than a decade. See id. The complaint
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examples obviously do not invalidate whatever good comes
from a successful investigation, but they do question the
press's ability to serve as an effective gatherer and dissemina-
tor of information with First Amendment significance.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON DAMAGES-A MORE PRODUCTIVE
WAY TO LIMIT MEDIA LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS
NEWSGATHERING
Whether tort suits against the media "chill" the production
of socially valuable information in a meaningful way is a matter
for debate. This debate requires at least preliminary resolu-
tion before the media is granted a partial immunity to commit
torts while gathering news. If tort law is not automatically
hostile to the First Amendment,"' and if any reduction in in-
vestigative reportage is not necessarily contrary to the First
Amendment, 49 the rationale for a newsgathering privilege dis-
sipates. Furthermore, advocates for a media privilege are un-
likely to convince the courts to create an explicit immunity for
tortious newsgatheringY5 0 Courts may, however, be willing to
exclude publication damages from any recovery for tortious
newsgathering.
A. THE PROPER APPROACH TO DAMAGES
While there is little reason to presume a conflict between
the trespass and intrusion torts and the First Amendment, a
potential conflict does arise if plaintiffs can recover damages
resulting from the publication of tortiously acquired informa-
tion.' Certainly the prospect of consequential damages may
chill media investigation. While the Food Lion court prohib-
ited any recovery of publication damages,'52 there is authority
also alleged that ABC received a similar tip from the Government Account-
ability Project, a group alleged to be closely aligned with the UFCW. See id.
148. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text (arguing that tortious
newsgathering may already occur at excessive levels).
150. See supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text (contending that a
newsgathering privilege cannot be grounded on the text, legislative history, or
Supreme Court interpretation of the First Amendment).
151. See Stern, supra note 16, at 148 (suggesting that plaintiffs may focus
on the medin's newsgathering conduct in an attempt to recover damages for
publication without facing the heightened First Amendment protections sur-
rounding publication).
152. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 966
(M.D.N.C. 1996).
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to the contrary.153 And the typical, formalistic trespass analy-
sis might indeed conclude that publication damages are proxi-
mately caused by the trespass. However, proximate cause is
itself a functional concern, which exists to further the policies
of tort law in general.5 4 Tortfeasors are typically liable for the
foreseeable consequences of their torts. 55 Presumably, allow-
ing recovery for all foreseeable damages provides the optimal
incentive for potential defendants to take precautions. It is
impossible to prepare against the unforeseen, so allowing re-
covery for all foreseeable damages encourages optimal precau-
tions by defendants and prevents excessive and inefficient pre-
cautionary measures.
In the First Amendment context, however, there is a sub-
stantial reason to exclude recovery of publication damages.
The act of publication is of great constitutional import, and
publication of truthful information is an activity worthy of sub-
stantial First Amendment protection. The Food Lion court al-
lowed the plaintiffs to recover punitive damages."6 While the
issue of whether punitive damages are appropriate for torts
committed while newsgathering is a difficult one, recent Su-
preme Court decisions have held that excessive punitive dam-
ages can violate due process.'57 One relevant factor in this
analysis is the relationship of the punitive damages award to
the compensatory damages, so the issue of whether plaintiffs
can recover for publication damages becomes crucial.
Despite cases like Dietemann, which allow plaintiffs to re-
cover damages resulting from publication of tortiously acquired
153. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971)
("No interest protected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by
permitting damages for intrusion to be enhanced by the fact of later publica-
tion of the information that the publisher improperly acquired.").
154. Cf. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law,
30 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 871 (1996). Judge Calabresi describes allocation of
loss, in an "all-or-nothing" tort regime (as opposed to a loss-sharing, compara-
tive negligence regime) as depending on a fluid use of proximate cause. See
id. Judge Calabresi states, "In effect, we compare fault and non-fault avoid-
ance and find that... this conclusion-which we call 'no proximate cause'-
determines who is the loss bearer." Id.
155. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928)
(defining legal wrongs "in terms of the natural or probable, at least when un-
intentional").
156. The Food Lion court allowed punitive damages on the theory that the
consciousness of wrongdoing required to commit an intentional tort was the
same as the actual malice standard in libel cases. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capi-
tal Cities/ABC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214, at *21-22.
157. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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information,'58 courts may be receptive to arguments that the
media should be insulated from publication damages. Proxi-
mate cause is likely to be the doctrinal tool for this limitation
on damages.'59 Proximate cause is a fluid concept, and the line
of causation can be drawn anywhere along the spectrum, de-
pending on the relevant policy goals.60 In the standard tort
context, it is most sensible to draw that line at foreseeability.
Publication damages, however, differ from the standard conse-
quential damages authorized in most tort actions. No interests
protected by the trespass or invasion of privacy torts are impli-
cated by the publication of most types of truthful information,
however obtained.161 Furthermore, when the interests protected
by these torts are implicated, such as when the information
published is needlessly intimate or places the plaintiff in a
false light, a plaintiff already has an adequate cause of action
in tort.'62 Courts, suspicious that plaintiffs are attempting to
recover vast damages for truthful publication without sur-
mounting the First Amendment protections for publication,63
may be receptive to these arguments.
158. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 250.
159. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 962-
63 (M.D.N.C. 1996), which held that Food Lion's lost profits and other publi-
cation damages stemmed from a loss of consumer confidence caused by the
store's allegedly sloppy food handling practices, and not from the broadcast of
those practices to the public. The Food Lion court also held that, even if ABC
could foresee these damages, acts of Food Lion employees severed the causal
link between ABC's tortious newsgathering and Food Lion's damages. See id.
at 963.
160. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 154, at 871-72 (describing the use of proxi-
mate cause to sever an undisputedly "causal" chain at a point that will be
most effective in deterring future accidents).
161. The Desnick court listed some of the interests protected by the tres-
pass and invasion of privacy torts, which include the right to keep secret
"embarrassingly intimate details" and private conversations, the right to pro-
tect trade secrets and to maintain a decorous business atmosphere; in short,
there was no invasion of a legally protected interest in property or privacy.
See Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1353 (7th Cir. 1995).
162. Plaintiffs may sue for private facts invasion of privacy where a mem-
ber of the media "gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of an-
other ... if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). In addition, false light in-
vasion of privacy makes tortious the publication of false information that
places the plaintiff in a "false light." See SACK& BARON, supra note 2, at 561.
This tort differs from defamation in that it protects injured feelings and not
reputation. See id. at 562.
163. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Although the suggestion that the media should be privileged
to commit minor torts while gathering news may be alluring,
such a privilege rests on a shaky foundation at best. Advocates
of a newsgathering privilege have offered no evidence that tort
doctrine fails adequately to resolve the competing First
Amendment and private rights issues. The Desnick court's ap-
proach, which refused to find a trespass where none of the
rights underlying the tort were infringed, illustrates that the
tension between the First Amendment and tort law is some-
what overstated. Ultimately, it may be true that Food Lion's
practices, assuming they were worthy of exposure, would have
remained undetected had ABC not engaged in its investigation.
Perhaps. But it may also be true that the costs to private par-
ties who find themselves the subject of media investigations
will substantially outweigh the benefits from the rare, and tor-
tious, discovery. In most cases, the same information will be
obtainable through less intrusive techniques. The standard
tort analysis ensures that those techniques remain the norm.
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